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Abstract-Security is a big issue for all networks in any
enterprise environment. Many solutions have been proposed to
secure the network infrastructure and communication over the
Internet. Intrusion Detection Systems with many different
techniques such as data mining approaches are employed to
maximize the detection rate of intrusions while reducing false
alarm rate. For instance, many clustering techniques are
recommended which segregate normal and abnormal data in
IDSs. Clustering methods put emphasis on finding differences
and similarities of traffic sessions to categorize each one in its
corresponding groups. These groups are represented by their
assigned labels. Later, these labels are used to predict the type of
the incoming network traffic. In this paper, we propose a
clustering scheme to use in intrusion detection systems, named
CluSID. The major contribution of CluSID is using information
theory for taking full advantages of clustering techniques. The
main logic behind CluSID is to use non-uniform gain functions
for network traffic features in order to improve the accuracy of
clustering process. To this end, we apply information theory
concepts for moving center of clusters to the most important
areas in the domain of the selected features. The results clearly
show a raise in detection rate of CluSID in most of the attack
categories in comparison to KDD CUP'99 Winner and simple
clustering methods. The increase in detection rate of proposed
system is about 25 percent.
Keywords- Intrusion Detecfion System, Clustering, Information
Theory, Entropy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring computer
networks and systems for recognition of security policy
violations. Intrusion detection augments the traditional audit,
which was designed to occur at infrequent intervals, thus,
making it a continuous process [101.
Anomaly and misuse detection are twvo major areas of
research in Intrusion Detection Systems. Misuse detection
systems encode and match the sequence of "signature actions"
of known intrusion scenarios. The main shortcoming of such
systems is that known intrusion patterns have to be hand-coded
into the system; they are unable to detect any future (unknown)
intrusions that have no matched patterns stored in the system.
Anomaly detection systems establish normal usage patterns
(profiles) using statistical measures on system features, i.e.
syscalls of a particular user or program. The main weakness of
these systems is that intuition and experience is relied upon in
selecting the system features, which can vary enormously
among different computing environments; some intrusions can
only be detected by studying the sequential interrelation
between events because each event alone may fit the profiles.
Therefore, the false alarm rates could be high.
An intrusion Detection System consists of an audit data
collection agent that collects information about the system
being observed. This data then is either stored or processed
directly by the detection engine. The output of the detection
engine is presented to the response system or the site security
administrator, who then can take further actions, normally
beginning with further investigation into the causes of the
alarm.
Wide variety of techniques have been applied to both
misuse and anomaly detection. Artificial Intelligence (Al) and
Rule based expert systems have served as the basis for several
systems. The acquisition of expert system rules is a tedious and
error-prone process. This problem has generated a great deal of
interest in the application of machine learning techniques to
automate the process of pattern learning. Examples include the
Time-based Inductive Machine (TIM) for intrusion detection
that learns sequential patterns and neural network-based
intrusion detection systems. More recently, techniques from the
fuzzy computing area have been used to separate normal
patterns from audit data and solve the problem of uncertainty in
defining the necessary thresholds.
As another solution, various data mining algorithms drawn
from fields of statistics, pattern recognition, machine learning
and database system have been deployed in the technology of
intrusion detection. Here are a few specific things that data
mining might contribute to an intrusion detection project:
1) Remove normal activities from alarm data to allow
analysts to focus on real attacks.
2) Identify false alarm generators and bad sensor
signatures.
3) Find anomalous activities that uncover real attacks.
4) Identify long, ongoing patterns.
5) Determines relations between various fields in a
database, and in data stream.
To accomplish these tasks, data miners use one or more of
the following techniques:
1) Data summariLation with statistics.
2) Visualilation: presenting a graphical view of the data.
3) Clustering: putting data into natural categories [6].
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4) Association rule discovery: defining normal activity and
enabling the discovery of anomalies ([7], [8]).
5) Classification: classifies a data item into one of several
pre-defined categories [9].
Clustering is the method of grouping objects into
meaningful subclasses so that members from the same cluster
are quite similar and members from different clusters are quite
different from each other. Therefore, clustering methods can be
useful for classifying log data and detecting intrusions.
The main contribution of this paper is improving the
detection rate of a Clustering Scheme for Intrusion Detection
(CluSID), using Information Theory. Constructing well
structured clusters makes the intrusion detection simpler in
CluSID. Moreover, factor analysis is being done using
Information Theory that could significantly help us to extract
important features. CluSID detects %83.48 of intrusions. It is
worth noting that this is an improvement with respect to KDD
CUP'99 Winner and systems based on simple clustering.
Furthermore, the probing attacks are detected with a
considerably higher rate.
The next section of this paper surveys the related work in
Data Mining frameworks and algorithms used in intrusion
detection. Section three depicts the design structure of
proposed system, and explains each part of the CluSID. Section
four reports the experimental results, and finally, section five
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Use of different classification and clustering algorithms for
Intrusion Detection has been reported in literature.
Furthermore, several Data Mining techniques have been
adapted for generating rules to find out normal and abnormal
signatures in network traffic.
Using data mining algorithms for classification of network
traffic and associating rules to them for network intrusion
detection have been proposed in [14] and [161. Also, in [151, a
data mining framework for constructing intrusion detection
models is outlined. The key idea is to apply data mining
programs on audit data to compute misuse and anomaly
detection models, according to the observed behavior in the
data. Meta-leaming has also been proposed as a means of
constructing a combined model that incorporate evidence from
multiple base models. ln addition, the basic association rules
and frequent episodes algorithms have been extended to
consider the special requirements in analyzing audit data.
Furthermore, classification algorithms play important roles
in intrusion detection systems. Most of these algorithms
developed until now somehow try to measure the relative
importance of an attribute in classification compared to others
and use this knowledge while classifying objects. Some of
them (i.e. [11) try to determine the relevant and irrelevant
features in a set of attributes in order to take relevant features
into account more than irrelevant ones. Others (i.e. [2]) attempt
to assign weights according to their degree of relevance on
classification of instances. In the later methods, some
transformation based approaches and genetic algorithms are
used to determine the weight of each attribute in a dataset [3].
A classification algorithm called ID3, which introduces the
concept of information gain, is proposed in [41, [5].
Moreover, K-means [13] is a typical clustering algorithm. It
partitions a set of data into k clusters through several steps. K-
means has been used for clustering data for decades. However,
it has two shortcomings in clustering large data sets: number of
clusters dependency and degeneracy. Number of clusters
dependency is that the value of k is very critical to the
clustering result. Obtaining the optimal k for a given data set is
an NP-hard problem [12]. Degeneracy means that the
clustering may end with some empty clusters. This is not what
we expect since the classes of the empty clusters are
meaningless for the classification. The H-means+ algorithm,
proposed in [12], can overcome the weakness by replacing the
empty cluster with a newly created cluster. The center of the
new cluster is the global furthest point of the data set. The
global furthest point is the local furthest point with the greatest
distance from its local center; and the local furthest point of a
cluster is the remotest point from the cluster center. When an
empty cluster is found in an iteration of K-means, the global
furthest point will be removed from its cluster and be
designated as a new cluster center to replace the empty cluster
center. After that, K-means iteration will go on until no empty
cluster exists.
III. CLUSID DESIGN STRUCTURE
Figure 1 illustrates the design of CtuSID system's training
and testing phases. In the training phase, the KDD training data
is clustered based on the result of Feature Selection and Gain
Computation modules. The centroid of each cluster is also
calculated and passed to the Detection Engine. Then, CluSID
engine uses these centroids to classify the incoming sessions
from the KDD test data.
DARAPA has provided a standard set of data which
includes a wide variety of intrusions simulated in a military
network environment. The 1999 KDD intrusion detection
contest used a version of this dataset [1 11.
The raw training data was about four gigabytes of
compressed binary TCP dump data. This was processed into
about five million connection records. Similarly, the test data
yielded around two million connection records. Each
connection is labeled as either normal or as an attack, with
exactly one specific attack type. Attacks fall into four main
categories:
I) DoS: Denial of Service, e.g. syn flood.
2) R2L: Unauthorized access from a remote machine, e.g.
guessing password.
3) U2R: Unauthorized access to local superuser (root)
privileges, e.g., various "buffer overflow" attacks.
4) Probing: Surveillance and other probing, e.g., port
scanning.
In the Training Phase, we have deployed several
components. As shown in Figure 1 we have used KDD train
data to select features and extract the centers of eight clusters.
These eight clusters consist of four attack and four normal
clusters. Number of clusters, are selected based on
experimental results, as explained in section IV.
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have domain C,. Then, the expected infonnation from this
domain membership is as follows:
k
Info(S) = - P(C,, S) x log(P(Cj, S))
i=l
(1)
Also, the Entropy of attribute A, that is spitted into subsets
(Al, , A,}is:
Entorpy(A) = -- 'A" xInfo(Ai)
= Isi (2)
Figure 1. CluSID design structure.
Every KDD connection record consists of 41 features. So,
the task of Feature Selection component and Gain
Computation Module is to select the more valuable features. In
this way, a subset of these 41 features is selected to detect the
attack sessions. Details of the methods that have been used to
accomplish this task will come in the next sections.
As mentioned above, every KDD training session has a
label vhich is either "normal" or an attack category name. The
Clustering component uses this information to cluster the
training data and compute the centers of the eight clusters.
After computation of the centers, mentioned component uses a
refinement method to improve its results. As the result of
training phase, center of eight clusters with selected features
are calculated, considering their gain value.
In the Testing Phase, the results of training phase and the
KDD test data are used. The detection engine labels every
session to be an attack type (DoS, R2L, U2R, and Probe) or
Normal. The result of this labeling is compared with correct
labels provided by KDD to analyze the system.
A. Computation ofPure Feature 's Gain
Different weights are assigned to different features for
representing the significance of them in traffic sessions. The
Gain function, first estimates these weights, by means of
calculating the pure gain of features. However using a uniform
weight for the values of the domain of a feature might reduce
the effect of more important values in favor of less important
values. Therefore pure gain values are not sufficient for fine
detections. But, in this section we use Information Theory
concepts to compute the gain, as is called; Pure Gain values, in
order to use and refine them in Gain Functions.
The set of values that could be assigned to a feature
represents the domain of that feature. Feature's domains could
be continuous or discrete. For example, {tcp, udp, icmp} are
values in the domain of "protocol_type" feature, and also the
domain of "srv serror rate" feature that shows the percentage
of connections having "SYN" errors, is Real numbers between
0-100.
Let S be the set of n instances and let C be the set of k
domains. Let P(C,, S) be the fraction of the examples in S that
Where ISI is the number of instances in S, and OAil is the
number of instances ofA belongs to Ai.
The Entropy is a measure of how much uncertainty is
involved in the selection of a symbol - the greatest the entropy,
the greatest the uncertainty. It can also be considered a measure
of the "information content" of the feature - more probable
attribute conveys less information than less probable ones.
Then, the difference between Info(S) and Entropy(A) gives
the information gained by partitioning S according to testing A
that we are named Pure Gain.
PureGain (A) = Info(S) - Entropy (A) (3)
This measure shows the value of an attribute in contrast to
all the other attributes. So a feature with high Pure Gain has
more significance in the decision mechanism.
B. Computation ofFeature 's Gain Functions
Calculating the information gain is straightforward for
nominal attributes since there are a finite number of distinct
values of each nominal attributes, and each instance is
associated with one of those values. Because most of the
features extracted in network sessions have continuous values,
the Pure Gain, formulated in (3), is not suitable as weight in our
clustering algorithm. Also, there are some ranges of values in
the domain of features which are more important for detecting
an attack. For example many attacks have used 0-200 bytes of
data for running their scenarios. Therefore a value between 0
and 200 for "Number of Bytes of Data fiom Destination to
Source" feature is more important than any other value outside
this range. Therefore, using a uniform Pure Gain value for
domain of a feature will decrease the detection power, and
increase the rate of false alarm in Intrusion Detection System.
Subsequently, we propose a partitioning algorithm for
distinguishing among the ranges of values in a domain, based
on their significance for detecting an attack. Gain of a feature is
a function that indicates usefulness of such feature in
throughout of its domain. After calculating pure gain for each
feature, a partitioning algorithm estimates the Feature Gain
functions, based on a statistical routine. Figure 2 shows the
partitioning result of sent data for about 200 - for cleanness -
sessions of KDD CUP"99 data. Distance of each point from
center, shows its value.
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Gain(x) = Count(i) x PureGain(A)
MaxCount
Figure 2. Partitioning of sample data, based on its feature values.
Partitioning algorithm in a domain is the process of splitting
a feature's domain to find more important and sensitive sub-
domains within a domain. For finding more important sub-
domains, we divide the domains into sub-domains and count
the number of samples (by means of Count function) in each
sub-domain or partition. Partitions with high count values are
assumed more important. The process starts with a constant
value as the number of partitions and iterates splitting partitions
until the difference of MaxCount, as the maximum value of
Count Function in all partitions, and 2`dMaxCourn, as the
second greatest value of the Count function, reaches to a pre-
learned threshold. By using normalized Count and selecting the
threshold based on it (difference of MaxNormalCount and
2"dMaxNormalCount), same threshold could be used for all
features. Wise selection of the threshold can help the algorithm
to avoid eliminating smaller values by comparing them to
higher values. Furthermore, based on experimental results, we
have selected 0.34 as the optimum value for this threshold.
However, this method is not suitable for discrete domains such
as "protocol type" and "service_type". For the features with
discrete domain, a good choice for the number of partitions is
the number of discrete values in the domain of the feature. (i.e.
"protocol type" will be partitioned to 3 parts: tcp, udp, and
icmp)
a 0.8
0
0.6
0
N
1X 0.4
0
z 0.2
0
0 28000
Value
Figure 3. Normalized Count vs. corresponding Value of a feature.
After finishing the iterations, final Gain of the features can
be computed by multiplying the normalized count and pure
gain, as formulated in (4) and illustrated in Figure 3.
Let x be the value of feature A in partition i, so the gain
function will be:
C Feature Extraction
A primary problem in Intrusion Detection Systems is
identifying a representative set of features from which to
construct a classification model for a particular manner
(normal, abnormal). The central hypothesis is that good feature
sets contain features that are highly correlated with the data
specifications, yet uncorrelated with each other.
In CluSID, feature selection is done-by eliminating features
with pure gain value less than a threshold. Setting the threshold
value is a trade-off between the power of detection rate and
speed of the detection. Since not all the features have similar
gain values, elimination of features with low gain values will
have minimal effect on the detection rate.
D. Clustering ofSessions
Clustering of traffic sessions and partitioning data into
clusters can help to identitfy specification of normal and
abnormal data and differentiate their pattems. Current
clustering methods such as k-means have been used for such
purposes. Using these techniques without considering the
behavior of network traffic may cause many false alarms
and/or miss errors.
In CluSID the task of clustering component is to create the
clusters, find their centers, and pass this infonnation to
Detection Engine. Based on the labeling of attacks in DARPA
data set, abnormal sessions are organized in clusters with
associated attacks category labels. In addition, based on our
experiments, it seems better to cluster nonnal data into four
clusters (equals to the number of abnormal data clusters). It
seems representing normal data with a single cluster, leads to
place the centroid of normal data in a position where the
chance of mislabeling marginal data (that are located in the
borders of abnormal data) is increased. Clustering of training
sessions includes two major steps:
* Primary clustering.
* Refinement of clusters.
As mentioned before, primary clustering of abnormal data
is only based on the DARPA labels. But for normal data, a
refined k-means clustering algorithm is used to cluster nonnal
data by considering their gain functions.
The procedure follows a straightforward way to classify a
given data set through a certain k number of clusters (4 clusters
in normal data set) fixed a priori. The main idea is to define k
centroids, one for each cluster. These centroids should be
placed in a cunning way because the location of the centroids
affects the results. So, the best choice is to place them as much
as possible far away from each other. The next step is to take
each member of the training data set and associate it with the
nearest centroid, based on the distance formula. When no point
is left, the first step is completed and an early grouping is done.
At this point we need to re-calculate k new centroids based on
the features weight of cluster centers, resulting from the
556
(4)
Authorized licensed use limited to: IEEE Xplore. Downloaded on October 29, 2008 at 19:09 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
previous step. After having these k new centroids, a new
binding has to be done between all of the data set points and
the nearest new centroid. This process is repeated again and in
each iteration all centroids change their location step by step
until no more changes are possible. In other words, centroids
do not move any more.
Above algorithm aims at minimizing an objective function,
in this case, weighted squared error function. The objective
function is:
Ej
k En= Di (5)
Where, k and n are the number of clusters and training
dataset members, respectively, and D,j is the distance of ih data
point from]j" cluster center.
Letfbe the number of selected features and GI is the return
value of gain function for feature 1, so DLij is computed as
following:
Dij Z[i lGjIX,, -ci4 (6)
Where xi, is value of 1't feature for point i, and c11 is value of
Ih feature for center of]ib cluster.
Primary clustering for all data has finished as described
above. Another round of k-means clustering is performed for
the eight clusters to tune the centers and reduce the error rate in
detection. Based on our experiments, a constraint of"boundaiy
distance" should be applied to the points to prevent their
migrating fron a cluster to another cluster, if their distance
from associated clusters is less than boundary distance. Half of
the minimum distance between cluster's centers is a good value
for boundary distance.
E. Detection Method
The Detection Engine's mission is to find appropriate
clusters for the test data. For these test data, CluSID calculates
each data point's position in the cluster space. Detection engine
has the specification of the features and their gain functions,
plus the center ofthe clusters.
Min = Di,;
MinlD= I;
Forj=2to8{
Calculate Dij;
If (D1j < Min) then {
Min= Dij;
MinID = j;
}
Figure 4. Pseudocode for finding corresponding cluster for x-
Therefore, base on (6) it calculates which cluster the sample
test session belongs to. Figure 4 illustrates the process of
finding corresponding cluster for session xI. The MinID is the
cluster number that the session xi belongs to. Based on the most
similar cluster, CluSID can label the session as normal or
abnormal.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
About 600,000 sessions of DARPA Data Set has been
selected and used for training phase of our system.
Furthermore about 400,000 sessions have been used for testing
the system. Statistical analysis and computation of gain values
are done by Matlab. Partitioning the domain of features was
required to calculate gain values. We have selected 0.34 as the
optimum value for the above mentioned threshold that is used
by partition algorithm to stop partitioning. This value is leamed
from simulations, and calculating corresponding detection rate
for different theshold values.
After normalizing the gain for each feature and calculating
gain functions, 13 features with smallest values have been
eliminated. Elimination of more features suddenly decreases
the power of detection engine. Although the results show high
detection power for CIuSID, but using all the features (no
feature reduction) actually exhibits even higher detection rate
in the expense of more time spent on detection (more useful in
offline detection systems).
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Figure 5. Detection rate ofCluSID vs. number of normal clusters.
As mentioned before, four clusters have been created that
specify abnormal groups in DARPA data set. We have
investigated changing effect of normal cluster numbers from
one to eight on the system's detection rate. Figure 5 depicts the
result of this test. As it is evident in the diagram by considering
the detection rate and the false alarm rate, the system performs
better when the number of normal clusters is equal to the
number of abnormal clusters. Using fewer numbers of normal
clusters leads to setting the center of normal clusters between
the abnormal data clusters, consequently increasing the false
alarm rate of the system. As shown in the graph, raising the
number of normal clusters results in reducing the number of
False Alarms as well as the detection rates. Because the
detection rate of CluSID is more important for us, we choose
four clusters as normal clusters.
After clustering and refinements phases, eight points are
discovered, as center of clusters. So the CluSID detection
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engine is constructed with 28 gain fumctions and 8 cluster
centroid points.
Finally, we compare the detecfion rate of CluSID against
that of the KDD CUP'99 Winner, and a detection engine based
on simple clustering. As depicted in Figure 6 in almost all
categories, the CluSID has demonstrated equal or better
detection rate. Furthermore, Normal data and Probing attacks
can be detected more accurately by C}uSID.
Figure 6. CluSID detection rate vs. KDD CUP'99 winner, and a simple
clustering system.
CluSID's ability to detect some attacks better than other
systems is contributed to its method of partitioning the domain
of the features. Also, some attacks that behave like normal
traffic can be discovered by CluSID. As shown in the diagram,
our scheme improves the detection rate by 25% on average, tn
comparison with the simple clustering systems. In addition, the
CluSID detects probe attacks more accurately (improvement of
about 10 percent) in contrast to KDD CUP'99 Winner.
Using all the 31 features of traffic sessions to construct the
detection engine, plus using all the traiming sessions ofDARPA
Data Set, could help the system to produce even better results.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have outlined a clustering method for
constructing a detection engine named CIuSID for intrusion
detection systems. Information theory concepts have been
employed for refining the center of clusters which result in a
better classification of incoming traffic sessions. An efficient
feature selection method is presented to choose the most
appropriate features by setting a threshold on gain values. On
the other hand, the Cross-Entropy techniques can be utilized for
this purpose.
Our experimental results show that the detection rate
achieved by the CluSID system is 25 percent higher than
simple clustering methods. Also, CluSID outperforms KDD
CUP 99 Winner in most attack categories. For example,
CluSID has about 10 percent improvement in probe attack
detection.
Since CluSID is flexible to tradeoff between high detection
rate and high speed detection, our proposed method might be
applied on various systems. Also, small amount ofmemory that
is used in the detection engine, make CluSID more attractive to
be used on IDS systems with restrict resources such as wireless
sensor networks.
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